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issues using a large dataset of Italian intermediaries over the period 1985-2002. In particular, 
estimating both static and dynamic models, it investigates whether loan loss provisions and 
non-performing loans show a cyclical pattern. The estimated relations may be employed to 
carry out stress tests to assess the effects of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ balance sheets. 
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* Banca d’Italia, Banking and Financial Supervision and University of York, Department of Economics and 
Related Studies. 1.  Introduction
1 
In recent years the issue of the possible procyclicality of banks’ activity has drawn the 
attention of both academics and policy makers. Indeed, to guarantee macro and financial 
stability, it is crucial to understand whether, and to what extent, banks are affected by the 
evolution of the macroeconomic environment and whether second round impacts occur. On 
the one hand, if the business cycle does influence banks, financial surveillance may need to 
be strengthened during recessionary phases, when banks are more likely to become fragile. 
On the other hand, if banks’ reaction to macroeconomic shocks exacerbates the effects of the 
downturn, it is appropriate to establish rules aimed at alleviating the procyclicality of banks’ 
operations. 
The stylized facts suggest that at the beginning of an expansionary phase in the 
economy firms’ profits tend to increase, asset prices rise and customers’ expectations are 
optimistic. Expansion of aggregate demand leads to a remarkable, often more than 
proportional, growth in bank lending and in the economy’s indebtedness. During the boom 
banks may underestimate their risk exposures, relaxing credit standards and reducing 
provisions for future losses.  
After the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, borrowers’ 
creditworthiness deteriorates and non-performing assets are revealed, thus causing losses in 
banks’ balance sheets (cyclicality). This may be associated with a fall in asset prices that, in 
turn, further affects customers’ financial wealth and depresses the value of collateral. 
Moreover, the possible rise of unemployment reduces households’ disposable income and 
their ability to repay their debts. Banks’ risk exposure increases, thus requiring larger 
provisions and higher levels of capital, at the very moment when it is more expensive or 
simply not available. Intermediaries may react by reducing lending, especially if they have 
                                                            
1  I am grateful to S. Laviola for continuous encouragement and useful suggestions; S. Grassi and A. 
Vezzulli for challenging discussions on panel data; M. Agostino, J. Marcucci, A. Sironi, the participants at the 
CCBS Forum of Financial Stability Experts at the Bank of England and the seminar at the University of York, 
and two anonymous referees for their comments. My special thanks to P. N. Smith for his patient and 
thoughtful guidance and to A. Ozkan and P. Spencer for their valuable advice. All remaining errors are my 
own. The opinions expressed here are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
E-mail: mario.quagliariello@bancaditalia.it.   8 
thin capital buffers above the minimum capital requirement, thus exacerbating the effects of 
the economic downturn (procyclicality). 
In principle, many banking variables are potentially able to convey signals about the 
evolution of banks’ riskiness over the business cycle; however, loan loss provisions and bad 
debts have been generally considered the transmission channels of macroeconomic shocks to 
banks’ balance sheets. 
Banks make loan loss provisions against profits when they believe that borrowers will 
default; this is the tool they can use to adjust the (historical) value of loans to reflect their 
true value. Provisions affect both banks’ profitability, since they represent a cost for the 
intermediary, and capital, since they reduce the book value of assets.  
It is common to distinguish between static (specific) and dynamic (general) provisions, 
where the former are based on current conditions of debtors and are made only when losses 
are known to occur, while the latter are set against expected losses on non-impaired loans. 
The principle that justifies dynamic provisions is that when a loan is granted there is already 
a positive and measurable probability that the bank will incur losses due to the debtor’s 
inability to honour his obligations. If loan loss provisions were forward-looking, the volume 
of bank capital would be related to the size of the unexpected losses and the procyclical 
effects of provisioning policies would be limited. Prudent banks might also use loan loss 
provisions to stabilize their earnings over time by reducing/increasing the flow of provisions 
when their performance worsens/improves. 
In practice, loan loss provisions are often backward-looking, as banks tend to 
underestimate future losses in periods of economic expansion because of disaster myopia 
(Guttentag et al., 1986), herding behaviour (Rajan, 1994) or because higher provisions are 
interpreted by stakeholders as a signal of lower quality portfolios (Ahmed et al., 1996). 
Banks tend to provision against actual rather than expected losses also because of accounting 
and fiscal rules that allow specific provisions only against impaired debts and do not permit 
tax deductibility for general provisions, since they cannot be documented and may be 
exploited by banks to reduce their fiscal burden.  
Sub-standard loans are also considered a good proxy for asset quality and a reliable 
leading indicator of bank fragility. In fact, there is clear evidence that the proportion of non-  9 
performing loans dramatically increases before and during banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998; Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999). The stock of outstanding bad debts is, 
however, a rough measure of credit quality; in fact it can decrease simply because some of 
the credits are written off. For this reason, the flow of new bad debts, i.e. the amount of loans 
classified as bad debts for the first time in the reference period, can be considered a more 
precise indicator of banks’ portfolio riskiness. 
Much empirical work has tried to verify the correctness of these stylized facts. Such 
investigations have generally focussed on a single banks’ performance indicator, using 
relatively small datasets; cross-country comparisons are prevalent, while cross-bank 
investigations (within the same country) are less common. 
This paper contributes to this stream of research using a large panel of Italian 
intermediaries whose data are available for the period 1985-2002. With respect to previous 
work, the paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive framework, although in a 
reduced-form modelling context, analyzing the movements of loan loss provisions and new 
bad debts over the business cycle. Both static fixed-effects and dynamic models are 
estimated to verify whether banks’ riskiness is linked (also) to the general economic climate 
and to understand the timing of banks’ reactions to economic changes. In a macro-prudential 
perspective, the outcomes may be employed to carry out stress tests that simulate the impact 
of some macroeconomic shocks on the Italian banking system.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I review the 
empirical literature dealing with the procyclicality of banks’ behaviour. Sections 3 and 4 are 
devoted to a description of the data used in the empirical exercise and the econometric 
methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the estimated models, their main findings and some 
robustness checks. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided. 
2.  A review of the literature 
Notwithstanding the lack of an established theoretical framework, there is a huge 
empirical literature studying the linkages between banking sector performance and the 
business cycle. The starting point of the analyses of procyclicality is that the models of banks 
performance that only include financial ratios as explanatory variables cannot take into   10 
account systematic problems arising from an adverse evolution of the macroeconomic 
environment. The general framework is therefore the following: 
Bank-specific variableit = bank specificit-j + macroeconomic variablesit-j 
where the bank data might be either at single bank or banking system level and the 
regressors either coincident or lagged. The specification can thus be a simple static model 
(i=1 and j=0), a distributed lag model (i=1 and j>0) or a panel (i>1, either cross-bank or 
cross-country). 
Since credit risk is still the main source of instability for most banks, the dependent 
variable is very often a measure of loan quality.  
For instance, Salas and Saurina (2002) analyze the relationship between bad loans and 
the economic cycle in Spain over the period 1985-1997. They observe that during economic 
booms banks tend to expand lending activity to increase their market share; this result is 
often reached by lending to borrowers of lower credit quality. They report that bad loans 
increase in recessionary phases and that the contemporary impact is much higher than the 
delayed impact, concluding that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted to banks’ 
balance sheets.  
In the same spirit, focussing on the banking crises of four Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland), Pesola (2001) assesses the usefulness of macroeconomic 
shocks in explaining two different indicators of bank distress such as the ratio of loan losses 
to lending and the number of non-financial companies’ bankruptcies per capita. According to 
his results, the high level of both corporate and households’ indebtedness, along with a 
higher than expected increase in the interest rate and GDP growth below forecasts, 
contributed to the banking crises in Sweden, Norway and Finland. 
The analysis performed by Gambera (2000) is quite different in style. He uses bivariate 
VAR systems and impulse response functions to study how economic development affects 
US banks’ loan quality. With respect to panel estimation, the VAR methodology allows all 
variables to be endogenously determined and has the advantage of fully capturing the 
interactions between bank and macro variables. His results suggest that a small number of   11 
macroeconomic variables (namely bankruptcy filings, farm income, annual product, housing 
permits and unemployment) are good predictors of the problem loans ratio.  
Other authors focus on the evolution of provisioning policies through the business 
cycle since loan loss provisions should reflect changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness and 
banks’ sentiment concerning the health of the real economy. 
Understanding banks’ provisioning behaviour is, for instance, the goal of Cavallo and 
Majnoni (2002) and Laeven and Majnoni (2003). The latter authors analyze large 
commercial banks’ policies in various countries to verify whether intermediaries use 
provisions to stabilize their income. They find that bankers, on average, smooth their 
earnings, but they create too little provision in good (macroeconomic) times. In other words, 
they find a negative relationship between provisions and loan and GDP growth, suggesting 
that banks provision during and not before recessions, thus magnifying the effects of the 
negative phase of the business cycle. Similar evidence is provided by the European Central 
Bank (2001) in its survey of provisioning practices in the EU; the report also points out that 
there is an almost simultaneous relationship between provisions and non-performing loans; 
in other words, banks seem to record provisions only when credit risk actually materializes. 
Regarding the relationship between provisions and profitability, there is no clear evidence of 
income-smoothing.  
Similarly to Laeven and Majnoni, Pain (2003) and Arpa et al. (2001) investigate the 
influence of the business cycle on loan loss provisions of UK and Austrian banks 
respectively. The first author considers a large set of explanatory variables proxying 
macroeconomic disturbances, firms and households’ indebtedness, financial and real asset 
price shocks, and documents that provisions exhibit some cyclical dependence. Arpa et al. 
(2001) conclude that provisions increase in periods of falling real GDP growth. They also 
find evidence that provisions are higher in times of rising bank profitability, supporting the 
income-smoothing hypothesis. 
An attractive view is provided by Bikker and Hu (2002), who estimate an unbalanced 
panel to evaluate the procyclicality of banks’ provisions for a sample of 26 OECD countries 
between 1979 and 1999. They find that the coefficients of GDP growth and inflation have a 
negative sign, while that of the unemployment rate is significantly positive. However, in   12 
years of higher net interest income the amount of provisions is larger, thus supporting the 
income-smoothing hypothesis. Therefore, the authors claim that, even if provisions go down 
in favourable (macroeconomic) times, banks tend to reserve more in good years (i.e. when 
profits are higher); as a result, banks are less procyclical than would appear just from looking 
at their dependence on the business cycle. 
In a recent paper Valckx (2003) considers the loan loss provisioning policy of EU 
banks using a sample of 15 European banking systems and a small panel of large EU banks. 
According to his results loan loss provisions are determined by GDP growth, interest rates 
and some bank-specific indicators both at sector level and for individual banks. The positive 
relationship between income margin and provisions suggests that the income-smoothing 
hypothesis for EU banks applies, thus contradicting the ECB’s findings. 
Summing up, good economic conditions positively affect the quality of banks’ 
portfolios as measured by some kind of sub-standard loan ratio. Moreover, there is some 
evidence on the issue of whether intermediaries tend to use loan loss provisions to smooth 
their income (i.e. they provision more when earnings increase). However, they do not make 
enough provision in good macroeconomic times (i.e. when GDP and loan growth are high). 
Therefore, when economic conditions reverse, loan losses start to emerge, provisions rise, 
profitability decreases and credit supply tends to decrease, thus amplifying the effects of the 
recession.  
3. The data and the sample 
The empirical analysis in this paper aims at investigating how Italian banks’ riskiness 
is affected by changes in general economic conditions. Following the existing literature, the 
analysis focusses on the evolution of loan loss provisions (hereafter, LLP) and new bad debts 
to test whether they show the expected cyclical pattern.  
With reference to the sample I select an unbalanced panel of 207 Italian intermediaries 
whose accounting ratios are available for at least 5 consecutive years in the period between 
1985 and 2002. The sample excludes all the mutual banks (banche di credito cooperativo)   13 
and, to reduce measurement errors, the outliers.
2 The resulting sample represents around 90 
per cent of the Italian banking system’s consolidated total assets.
3 Along with this large 
unbalanced sample I use a smaller panel of 11 large banks whose data are available for the 
whole period under examination (18 years) to carry out robustness checks.
4  
A summary of the characteristics of the two samples is provided in Table 1. 
Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the supervisory 
statistics that intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy and the information of 
the Italian Credit Register; the macroeconomic variables are drawn from the Bank of Italy 
and ISTAT statistics and from Datastream. In general, the macroeconomic variables and 
most of the bank-specific indicators are available at a quarterly frequency and over quite a 
long time span, even though data homogeneity may be an issue for some time series.  
Unfortunately, P&L account ratios are only available on a semi-annual basis since 
1993; before that date they were annual. Since the focus of the paper is on the evolution of 
banks’ riskiness through the business cycle, the longer time span is preferred to the higher 
frequency of the observations. Annual data are therefore used. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the variables I consider in the analysis and provide some 
descriptive statistics. 
The loan loss provision ratio (LLP) and the flow of new bad debt ratio (RISKFL) vary 
by construction between 0 and 1. Some authors have suggested using the log-odds 
transformation of such variables to create an unbounded series between minus and plus 
infinity. Actually, this seems more a philosophical than a practical issue. In fact, as these 
variables are typically in the range 0-0.1, the correspondent log-odds ratios are very far from 
varying between plus/minus infinite as well (Table 4). 
                                                            
2 I exclude outlier banks by eliminating the observations in which the values of the bank-specific variables 
(except SIZE) are above and below the last and the first percentile respectively. 
3 During the 1990s the Italian banking system experienced an intense process of mergers and acquisitions. 
To deal with the impact of these operations on the sample I assumed that they took place at the beginning of the 
sample period, consolidating the balance-sheet items of the banks involved. 
4 The sample includes banks with total assets equal to at least 20 billion euros; it represents more than 65 
per cent of Italian banks’ consolidated total assets.   14 
Finally, some concerns may derive from the presence of unit roots in the series 
considered in the analysis. Im, Pesaran and Shin’s (2003) unit root tests for panel data are 
therefore carried out; results for the two dependent variables are reported in Table 5.
5 
Tests are performed including both a constant and a constant and time trend and 
considering both the raw and the demeaned data. The t-bar statistics are always significant at 
any conventional level, thus confirming that the series for loan loss provisions and new bad 
debts are stationary. 
4. The econometric methodology 
The analysis in this paper is carried out using a simple estimation strategy. I start with 
a static (reduced form) regression using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) model, 
since fixed effects seem a priori able to catch the heterogeneity across individuals, without 
imposing restrictive conditions on the correlation between the regressors and the error term.
6 
I select the starting set of regressors according to results that emerged in previous 
empirical analyses. In principle, several variables (GDP, investments, consumption, etc.) 
might be employed as proxies for the phase of the business cycle; however, a preliminary 
investigation suggested the use of GDP growth as the main indicator of the aggregate 
economic activity.
7  
                                                            
5 For simplicity I present only the unit root tests for the dependent variables; tests are, however, carried out 
for all the regressors as well. For the microeconomic explanatory variables, except RISKST, the tests generally 
do not find significant evidence of the presence of a unit root. Interestingly, the standard Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests (ADF) performed on the aggregate time series fail to reject non-stationarity, thus confirming the 
advantage in terms of power of also exploiting cross-sectional information. Finally, it is worth noting that most 
of the macroeconomic series, even the first-differenced ones, seem to be non-stationary according to the ADF 
tests. This result is affected, however, by the low power of the test, especially in small samples and for near 
unit root processes (Enders, 1995). More powerful tests, such as Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin 
(1992) unit root tests for the null hypothesis of trend stationarity, fail to reject stationarity at the 5 per cent 
level. 
6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to set up a complete structural model, even though a system of 
simultaneous equations might be an appealing tool to describe the co-movements of the variables. 
7 Indeed, the inclusion of investment and consumption changes produced some puzzling results. The use of 
firms’ and households’ indebtedness, which are frequently found to be important signals of fragility of the real 
sector, did not significantly improve the performance of the model and dramatically reduced the sample span, 
since homogeneous figures for these variables are available since 1990. Moreover, there is no clear-cut 
evidence on the expected effects of these variables (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Pain, 2003).   15 
Along with GDP growth I also include other macroeconomic indicators – interest rates 
and the evolution of the stock exchange – that are not intended as business cycle indicators, 
but try to proxy the competitive conditions in credit markets, debt burden for households and 
firms, and borrowers’ financial wealth. Therefore, they should provide additional 
information regarding the impact of the macroeconomic environment on banks’ operations.  
The lag structure of the explanatory variables takes into account the plausible delay 
with which macroeconomic shocks affect banks, the frequency of the observations and the 
need to start from a quite general model without losing excessive degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, as a general rule, the explanatory variables enter the regressions with the current 
value and one lag; GDP growth enters with 2 lags since its impact on banks is frequently 
found to be long-lasting in the empirical analyses. As a consequence of the insertion of 
lagged variables, the period under examination is 1987-2002. At this stage, all the 
explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous. 
The most parsimonious specification is subsequently chosen through the general-to-
simple approach, dropping the less significant variable at each stage and ending up with a set 
of regressors significant at the 5 per cent level. A preliminary diagnostic revealed the 
presence of both groupwise heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation. I consequently 
use the Newey-West robust standard errors to carry out inference.  
As robustness checks, the most parsimonious representations are re-estimated using 
the pooled regression and the random effect model. 
Although the static model is the natural starting point for analyzing the relationship 
between economic activity and banks’ stability, there is no consensus on its appropriateness 
for explaining the behaviour of LLP and non-performing loans through the business cycle.
8 
For instance, with regard to LLP, Pain (2003) wonders whether banks register in their 
balance sheets the full amount of any probable losses as soon as the borrower defaults 
(suggesting that the static model is appropriate) or whether instead they update the 
assessment of the probable losses according to new information in each period (suggesting 
                                                            
8 Valckx (2003), ECB (2001), Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) use a static model only; Salas and Saurina 
(2002) prefer the dynamic equation, while Pain (2003) estimates both the static and the dynamic specifications.   16 
that provisions are systematically related and, therefore, the dynamic specification may be 
better). 
As far as non-performing loans are concerned, Salas and Saurina (2002) use a dynamic 
equation under the assumption that the one-period variable is likely to be related to that of 
the previous periods since problem loans are not immediately written off and they can 
remain in the balance sheet for a long time.  
To address these issues the equations for loan loss provisions and new bad loans are 
re-estimated using a dynamic specification. A relevant advantage of the dynamic model is 
that it allows the release of the assumption of exogeneity of the regressors, which is unlikely 
to hold at least for some of the current levels of the bank-specific variables. 
When the lagged dependent variable is included in the set of the explanatory variables, 
OLS estimates become inconsistent since regressors are no longer uncorrelated with the error 
term. These problems can be addressed by first-differencing the model, thus eliminating the 
individual effects, and using instrumental variable estimators such as those proposed by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The two procedures produce 
consistent estimates; however, the Arellano and Bond generalized method of the moments 
(GMM) estimator is more efficient and is the one used here.  
Following the Arellano-Bond methodology, the differences of the strictly exogenous 
regressors are instrumented with themselves and the dependent and 
predetermined/endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged levels.
9 In particular, 
while predetermined variables are instrumented using their levels lagged by one or more 
periods, the dependent and the other endogenous variables are instrumented with their levels 
lagged by two or more periods. The procedure requires there to be no second-order 
correlation in the differenced equation; indeed, while the presence of first-order 
autocorrelation in the error terms does not imply inconsistency of the estimates, the presence 
of second-order autocorrelation makes estimates inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
                                                            
9 In the following analysis, a regressor xit is considered: strictly exogenous if E[xitεis]=0 for all t and s; 
predetermined if E[xitεis]=0 for s≥t and E[xitεis]≠0 if s<t; endogenous if E[xitεis]=0 for s>t and E[xitεis]≠0 if s≤t.   17 
5. The models and the results 
5.1 Loan loss provisions 
In Italy, the rules banks must respect in the evaluation of their loans are established by 
Legislative Decree 87/1992 on banks' individual and consolidated accounts (implementing 
Directive 86/635/EEC) and by the Bank of Italy supervisory guidelines.  
Loan loss provisions are typically raised on a case-by-case basis to cover potential 
losses on non-performing loans (specific provisions); portfolio-specific general provisions 
are allowed for homogeneous categories of loans, such as sectoral loans and country-risk 
exposures. Along with these adjustments, which are not reported as contra-assets, banks can 
charge general provisions to the profit and loss account to create prudential reserves; they are 
therefore set up against unforeseen events and do not have an asset-adjustment function, but 
can be computed in the Tier 2 capital up to 1.25 per cent of risk weighted assets.
10 
Since, as mentioned above, the stock of LLP may decrease not only because of an 
improvement in the debtors’ financial conditions but also because the underlying credits are 
written off, the stock ratios are not necessarily timely indicators of banks’ health; I therefore 
employ a flow rather than a stock measure.  
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between loan loss provisions and some of 
the possible explanatory variables over the period 1985-2002.  
It emerges that LLP are negatively related to GDP and credit growth implying that, on 
average, banks provision less in favourable economic times.  
However, a more careful analysis shows that the correlation between LLP and GDP is 
not stable over time.
11 Looking at Figure 1, which plots the LLP ratio and GDP growth, it is 
not possible to identify a clear-cut link.  
                                                            
10 In Italy, fiscal regulations allow banks to deduct from their gross income value adjustments on credits 
(i.e. specific provisions) and general provisions up to 0.6 per cent of their total loans. 
11 This is not completely unexpected. Pain (2003) finds that the relationship between LLP and the business 
cycle for UK banks is not stable either; for instance, he notes that provisions did not increase significantly 
during the recession of the early 1980s.   18 
Indeed, while the evidence for some years (e.g. 1986, 1993 and 2000) confirms that 
banks provision less in good times, in other periods the relationship tends to reverse and 
banks seem to adopt more forward-looking and counter-cyclical provisioning policies. In 
particular, in 2001 and 2002 LLP show a descending trend, suggesting that the recent 
downturn has not affected credit quality as strongly as in the past, possibly because of the 
lower level of interest rates or the improvement in banks’ credit risk management. The slight 
increase in 2001 may be explained by recalling that, in that year, some important Italian 
banks had to make substantial provisions to deal with the crises of several Latin American 
countries and some international conglomerates. 
5.1.1 Static model 
The estimated model for loan loss provisions is the following: 
LLPit = α + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui + εit    ( 1 )  
i= 1,..., 207 (206 for ui); t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable 
where LLP is the loan loss provision ratio, BSV are the bank-specific variables, MV the 
macroeconomic indicators, u the individual unobservable effects and ε the error term. 
The starting model includes the following bank specific variables: 
•  CREDGR (contemporaneous and lagged by 1 year) is the growth of performing 
loans for each bank. It might signal either a positive phase of the business cycle if it 
is led by demand factors (suggesting a negative sign) or an aggressive supply policy 
of banks, which in turn entails lower credit standards, the exposure to excessive 
risks and higher future provisions (suggesting a positive sign). It is therefore 
plausible that CREDGR will show a negative sign when current values are 
considered and positive when lagged (Salas and Saurina, 2002). However, the 
empirical evidence for other countries is somewhat mixed and does not allow me to 
conclude that rapid credit growth automatically implies future problems. It is 
interesting to note that if provisions are dynamic the contemporaneous CREDGR 
should have a positive effect on LLP as well.   19 
•  The cost-to-income ratio (CIRATIO) is a commonly used indicator of banks’ 
efficiency; banks with higher values of the ratio are expected also to be less 
effective in the selection of borrowers and, in turn, to make higher provisions. 
Besides, inefficient banks may be tempted to engage in riskier lending. On the other 
hand, some people argue that banks that decide to undertake expensive investments 
to improve their borrowers’ selection techniques should have less risky portfolios; if 
this is the case, the sign might be negative (Pain, 2003). 
•  The return on assets (ROA) is a measure of profitability before loan loss provisions 
are registered in banks’ balance sheets. It can be thus used to test whether banks use 
provisions to smooth their income. If the income-smoothing hypothesis holds, the 
coefficient of the ROA should have a positive sign. 
•  RISKST (the ratio of the stock of non-performing loans to total loans) provides a 
reliable proxy for the overall quality of a bank’s portfolio. The worse the 
creditworthiness of the customers, the higher the provisions against loan losses. One 
lag of the variable is included as well. 
•  RISKFL (the ratio of the flow of non-performing loans at t to total performing loans 
at t-1, i.e. the default rate) should pick up banks’ ability to select good new 
borrowers. From a logical point of view, loan loss provisions should precede the 
emergence of bad debts, since the former should cover expected losses arising from 
loans (i.e. bad debts). In fact, provisions are often made only when losses actually 
materialize and their amount is typically determined on the basis of the losses 
experienced in the past (on this point see Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). In other 
words, bank management uses provisions to adjust the value of their portfolio 
consistently with the observed ex-post default rate. The expected sign is positive 
since banks that are not able to screen potential debtors are more likely to incur loan 
losses in the future. 
For the macroeconomic determinants, the selected indicators are: 
•  GDPCC (the annual growth of real GDP) is the main and most direct measure of 
aggregate economic activity and, according to the prevailing view that banks do not 
provision in good times, it is expected to be inversely related to loan loss   20 
provisions. Along with the contemporaneous value, two lags are introduced in the 
specification to understand the delay with which the worsening of the real economy 
affects credit quality.  
•  BTPR is the interest rate on long-term (10-year) Italian Treasury bonds. Higher 
interest rates entail an increasing debt burden for banks’ borrowers. Households and 
firms may thus have greater difficulty in paying their loans back, especially if they 
are hugely indebted (Benito et al., 2001). On the other hand, interest rates are 
typically higher in expansionary phases when provisions are more likely to be low. 
The sign of the coefficient is therefore ambiguous. 
•  MIBC is the annual appreciation/depreciation of the stock exchange index and is a 
very rough proxy for the state of health of financial markets. In periods of bullish 
markets, the net wealth of households and firms tends to increase, thus making it 
easier to honour financial obligations (negative association). On the other hand, 
when the value of collateral appears particularly high, banks may be tempted to 
reduce their screening activity making their portfolios riskier (positive association). 
Finally, it is frequently found that financial markets show a boom and bust pattern 
(see, among the others, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1999); in other words, the bullish 
phase might precede a sharp decline in asset prices; according to this view, one 
would expect a negative sign for the lagged coefficient and a positive sign for the 
contemporaneous one. 
•  The SPREAD between loan and deposit’ rates is a proxy for banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour, even though it is also affected by the degree of competition in 
credit/deposit markets. More generally, the widening of financial spreads may 
anticipate cyclical movements in aggregate activity and the increase of default risk 
(Davis and Henry, 1994). 
Table 7 presents the regression results. Newey-West standard errors are calculated 
assuming an autocorrelation up to the order 2, but results are very similar when I use a 
higher number of lags. 
Consistently with the findings of the literature, Italian banks seem to be short-sighted 
to a certain extent. Indeed, they reduce their provisions when credit supply (CREDGR) and   21 
GDP (GDPCC) increase, thus reinforcing the idea that provisions are not dynamic and that 
intermediaries systematically under-provision during the upswing phases of the cycle. 
However, the coefficient of the second lag of GDP growth is larger than that of the current 
value, implying that the most relevant cyclical impacts are not instantaneous, but delayed 
and long lasting. The overall long-run partial effect of a 1 per cent change in GDP is equal to 
around –0.17, comparable with the values provided by Pain (2003), Valckx (2003) and 
Bikker and Hu (2002).  
Turning to credit growth, as already mentioned it might be led by both demand and 
supply factors; it is therefore difficult to use such a variable to decide whether banks 
pursuing higher lending growth rates are more likely to accept riskier borrowers. Since this 
is an important issue, I re-estimate the model using a sort of  abnormal growth indicator (i.e. 
the difference between the single bank’s growth rate and the average for the banking 
system), which should mainly reflect supply-side determinants. The estimated coefficients 
for this modified indicator remain negative, indicating that it is not necessarily true that more 
aggressive lending policies imply a less accurate selection of customers.   
As far as the profitability indicator is concerned, the positive sign of the current ROA 
coefficient indicates that banks tend to use provisions to stabilize their income over time, as 
found by Arpa et al. (2001), Bikker and Hu (2002) and Valckx (2003). Banks’ cyclical 
behaviour appears therefore to be partially offset by income-smoothing policies.  
Interest-rate spread shows a negative association with LLP, contrasting the hypotheses 
that it either proxies risk taking or anticipates cyclical downturns; however, it is worth 
underlining that the indicator is calculated for the banking system as a whole and can 
therefore hide differences across banks. 
The coefficient on the Treasury bond rate (BTPR) shows a positive sign, which should 
support the idea that higher interest rates make it more difficult to honour financial 
obligations. As in previous empirical analysis financial asset prices (MIBC) show a boom 
and bust cycle with negative lagged coefficients and positive contemporaneous coefficients; 
the overall long-run effect is negative, but it does not seem particularly large. 
Finally, as expected, banks provision according to the overall riskiness of their 
portfolio (RISKST) and to their ability to effectively select new customers (RISKFL). The   22 
past history of bad debts is therefore an important element in banks’ choice of provisioning 
policies. 
As far as the overall goodness of fit is concerned, the value of the R-squared (0.5 per 
cent) is acceptable and in line with the previous literature. Moreover, the model picks up the 
main turning points of the evolution of LLP and the confidence intervals for the (in-sample) 
predictions are reasonably small (Figure 2). 
The fixed-effect model seems appropriate as confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier and the Hausman tests, which reject the pooled regression and the 
random-effect model respectively. The F-test confirms that the individual dummies are 
jointly significant at any conventional level. In any case, coefficient estimates seem robust to 
different estimation techniques; for instance, the partial effect of GDPCC is not dramatically 
different in the three specifications.  
In this kind of investigation the reliability of the empirical results may be undermined 
by the presence of structural changes. As far as Italian banks are concerned, a possible break 
may be due to the reform of the Banking Law in 1993 (which came into force in 1994). 
Unfortunately, problems of multicollinearity in sub-samples make it difficult to carry out a 
complete Chow test for the stability of the coefficients. However, since GDP growth is the 
key variable of the analysis, I include a time intercept dummy (D94 equal to 1 from 1994 
and 0 otherwise) and two slope dummies for the lagged values of GDPCC (D94*L1GDPCC 
and D94*L2GDPCC) and test their joint significance. The coefficients of the dummies turn 
out to be significant, picking up some possible break; nonetheless, the good performance of 
the fitted values means that excessive emphasis need not to be placed on this problem. 
5.1.2 Dynamic model 
Although the static estimates appear very supportive of the conjecture that loan loss 
provisions are cyclical, the exercise is replicated including some dynamics. The resulting 
regression is the following: 
LLPit = α + ΣγjLLPit-j + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui + εit     ( 2 )  
i= 1,..., 207 (206 for ui); t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable   23 
which, once first differenced, reduces to: 
∆LLPit = Σγj∆LLPit-j + ∆BSVit-jβ + ∆MVt-jδ +∆εit     ( 3 )  
The need to difference the equation reduces the time period available for the estimation 
by one further year. Compared with the static model, I introduce two lags of the dependent 
variable.  
In estimating equation (3) I treat all the explanatory variables as strictly exogenous, 
except the contemporaneous values of the bank-specific indicators, which are treated as 
endogenous. In principle, some of the current macroeconomic variables might be 
endogenous as well, since banking system performance is likely to have second-round 
effects on the real economy. Granger causality tests carried out on the aggregated series 
generally rule out that microeconomic variables Granger cause macroeconomic ones;
12 
therefore, even though Granger non-causality is weaker than the condition for exogeneity, I 
treat macroeconomic indicators as exogenous. Finally, since the number of instruments may 
become very high using the Arellano-Bond estimator, I allow up to 5 lags of the 
instrumented variables. The one-step estimation results for the Arellano-Bond model are 
reported in Table 8. 
They show an acceptable convergence with the outcomes of the static exercise. The 
two lags of the dependent variable are significant and show the expected sign. Higher 
provisions in the past are therefore reflected in higher provisions now. The marginal effect is 
not excessively high (0.22), consistent with the fact that the dependent variable is a flow 
indicator.  Most of  the relevant bank-specific variables of the static model remain significant 
in the dynamic equation. Both the stock and the flow riskiness indicators are highly 
significant and, not surprisingly, are confirmed as the main microeconomic determinants of 
loan loss provisions. Interestingly, part of the information on portfolio riskiness provided by 
RISKST seems to be absorbed by the two lags of the dependent variable; in fact, it is 
plausible that they already incorporate the bank’s loan quality history. The return on assets is 
no longer significant, indicating that the evidence of income-smoothing behaviour is not 
particularly robust, as suggested by previous works.   24 
As to the macroeconomic variables, all the relevant indicators continue to be 
significant. In particular, the long-run effect of a 1 per cent GDP change on loan loss 
provisions is 0.13, as against 0.17 estimated with the static model. The 2-year delayed effect 
is now the only statistically significant one, reinforcing the hypothesis that banks’ riskiness 
is slowly affected by business cycle fluctuations. 
Table 8 also reports the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals. The tests find evidence of significant negative first-order autocorrelation, and no 
evidence of second-order autocorrelation. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
based on the two-step GMM estimator is not significant at any conventional level, failing to 
reject the validity of the instruments used in the analysis.
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5.2 New bad debts 
In Italy, according to the Legislative Decree 87/1992 and the supervisory guidelines, 
exposures must be valued at their estimated realisable value. Loans are therefore classified as 
performing, substandard and bad debts depending on the intensity of the difficulties affecting 
the debtor. In particular, exposures are classified as bad loans when, regardless of the 
existence of guarantees and collateral: i) the borrower has been declared insolvent or ii) the 
borrower is facing serious economic difficulties that may permanently threaten his ability to 
pay back the loan. Notwithstanding the lack of an objective definition of bad loans, Italian 
banks tend to classify their exposures correctly and with appropriate timing (Moody’s, 
2003), making them a good indicator of the riskiness of banks’ debtors. As for LLP, I use the 
flow measure rather than the stock; since the indicator is built up as the ratio of the loans 
classified as bad debts in the reference year to the performing loans outstanding at the end of 
the previous year, it can be interpreted as a default rate.
14 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
12 In particular, no dependent variable Granger causes GDP growth at any conventional significance level. 
13 The Sargan test from the one-step estimator is not heteroskedasticity-consistent (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991). 
14 While the use of the flow of LLP is quite common in empirical exercises (see, among others, Cavallo and 
Majnoni, 2002; Pain, 2003; Valckx, 2003), the flow of new bad debts is less widespread, probably because of 
problems of data availability.    25 
Table 9 reports the correlation coefficients between the new bad debt ratio and the 
relevant micro and macroeconomic indicators.  
Virtually all the macroeconomic variables are significantly correlated with banks’ 
portfolio riskiness and, as expected, bad debts tend to decrease during upturns. However, as 
for loan loss provisions, the relationship is not constant over time (Figure 3). 
For instance, the new bad debt ratio significantly increased during the 1993 recession, 
but not in the last downturn. In fact, in 2001 and 2002, notwithstanding the very negative 
economic conditions, bad debts did not show any significant increase. A possible 
explanation is that banks have improved borrower selection criteria in the last years; besides, 
the historically very low level of interest rates and the limited level of indebtedness may 
have helped firms and households to honour their debts even in such a recessionary period.  
5.2.1 Static model 
The estimated model is: 
RISKFLit = α + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui + εit      ( 4 )  
i= 1,..., 207 (206 for ui); t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable 
where RISKFL is the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to performing loans.  
Most of the bank-specific variables included in model (4) are the same employed in the 
LLP equation and, more specifically: 
•  CREDGR and CIRATIO, which should behave as described for the LLP equation. 
•  INTM (the ratio of interest income to total assets) is a proxy for the riskiness of the 
loan portfolio since higher interest rates should typically be charged against lower 
quality credits, which are more likely to turn into bad debts (positive sign). On the 
other hand, as pointed out by Salas and Saurina (2002), INTM might proxy 
managers’ incentive to switch to riskier credit policy when things turn bad 
(gambling for resurrection), as signalled by the curbing of the margin. According to 
this second interpretation, the expected sign should be negative, at least for the 
lagged coefficients.    26 
•  EQCAPIT (the ratio of equity capital to total assets) may be interpreted, in an 
agency cost framework, as a proxy for risk-taking behaviour. The higher the 
riskiness of the bank, the higher is the share of equity capital the shareholders have 
to invest to convince other stakeholders to support the bank. On the other hand, 
there are models suggesting that well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse.
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The macroeconomic indicators are the same (and with the same lag structure) as those 
selected for the LLP equation, namely GDP growth (GDPC), T-bond interest rate (BTPR), 
Stock Exchange index changes (MIBC), and the loan-deposit rates spread (SPREAD). 
The results for the bad debts equation are provided in Table 10. 
Three bank-specific variables (lagged CREDGR and CIRATIO and current INTM) 
turn out to be significant. However, while the former shows the expected sign, CIRATIO 
behaves in a odd way, changing its sign when lagged. The sign of CIRATIO might be 
justified on the basis that high values of the indicator not only reflect bank inefficiency, but 
also the use of more advanced, but expensive, methodologies for screening borrowers (see 
Pain, 2003). This explanation for the negative lagged coefficient, although appealing in this 
context, does not seem completely convincing. The coefficient of INTM is positive, 
providing some support for the Salas and Saurina story of managerial incentives to focus on 
riskier (but more profitable) investments in bad times; in other words, when serious 
problems arise, banks may decide to gamble for resurrection. 
As far as the macroeconomic variables are concerned, bad debts increase in the 
negative phases of the business cycle; the effect of GDP growth is immediate, as suggested 
by previous work, but also long-lasting. In the long run, a 1 per cent GDP growth makes the 
new bad debt ratio decrease by 0.33 percentage points, quite close to the figure provided by 
Salas and Saurina. The evolution of interest rates seems to affect debtors’ capacity to repay 
their loans, as shown by the positive coefficient of BTPR; the coefficient of the SPREAD 
between loan and deposit rates is not significant. 
                                                            
15 For a review, see Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2003). Data on other indicators of banks’ capitalization, such 
as the capital buffer (i.e. the capital above the regulatory minimum), are not available for the whole period 
under examination.    27 
Overall, the model fits the data sufficiently well with a value of the R-squared equal to 
0.5; the comparison between actual and fitted values is also satisfactory (Figure 4). 
There are some concerns about the suitability of the fixed-effect model in this case 
since the Hausman test fails to reject the random-effect estimates. However, the values of the 
coefficients in the RE regression are quite close to those of the LSDV one.
16 
5.2.2 Dynamic model 
The relation between the flow of new bad debts and the business cycle is re-estimated 
in the context of a dynamic model. The specification is as follows: 
RISKFLit = α + ΣγjRISKFLit-j + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui + εit     (5) 
i= 1,..., 207 (206 for ui);  t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable 
Taking the first difference: 
∆RISKFLit = Σγj∆RISKFLit-j + ∆BSVit-jβ + ∆MVt-jδ +∆εit     (6) 
The starting model includes, along with the variable used in the static model, two lags 
of the dependent variable. As in the LLP equation, I consider the contemporaneous values of 
the banks’ specific regressors as endogenous and all the other explanatory variables as 
exogenous. I allow up to 5 lags of the instrumented variables.  
Table 11 reports the results for model (6). 
The one-year lagged dependent variable is significant and, as expected, has a positive 
coefficient. The magnitude (0.15) is much smaller than that reported by Salas and Saurina 
(around 0.5), although they use the stock of bad debts, which is obviously stickier and more 
persistent than the flow indicator. 
Apart from those for INTM, the results show a satisfactory stability in terms of the 
coefficients’ signs, even though some of the parameters are altered in magnitude with respect 
to the static specification. The coefficient of INTM is now negative, which is consistent with 
                                                            
16 As for the LLP equation, I carried out a test for the stability of the coefficients that failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of parameter constancy.    28 
the belief that higher interest rates are charged against riskier lending; however, the 
differences between the static and the dynamic model make it advisable to interpret this 
result with caution.  
For the macroeconomic variables, the effect of a 1 per cent GDP increase on the flow 
of new bad debts is equal to around 0.23, as against 0.33 found in the static model. Lagged 
SPREAD and long-term interest rates are also significant and positive, as expected on the 
basis of the debt burden hypothesis. 
In terms of the diagnostics, Arellano-Bond tests find significant negative first-order 
autocorrelation and no evidence of second-order serial correlation; the Sargan test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments at any conventional level. 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section I carry out some robustness checks. First, I use a small panel of large 
intermediaries to assess whether the econometric relations estimated so far are common to 
different categories of banks. Second, I analyze whether the effects of GDP growth are 
asymmetric, i.e. whether their magnitude is different during upturns and downturns. 
6.1 Are large banks different? 
To verify whether the results obtained in the previous section are common for different 
categories of banks, I re-estimate the fixed-effect models using the balanced panel of large 
banks. In general, I do not necessarily expect the microeconomic determinants of banks’ 
behaviour to be exactly the same for larger intermediaries. However, I presume that the basic 
macroeconomic indicators remain significant and exhibit the same kind of association with 
the dependent variables. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 12. 
The outcomes are fairly similar to those obtained with the unbalanced panel, although 
some of the bank-specific variables are no longer significant.  
As in the unbalanced panel, provisions tend to decrease as a share of total assets when 
GDP grows. However, in the loan loss provisions equation, the impact of GDP growth is 
much smaller in magnitude with respect to the unbalanced panel. This may be interpreted as   29 
a first indication that larger banks are less affected by external factors when setting their 
provisioning policies. ROA is not significant; large banks do not seem to use provisions in 
order to smooth their income. This is consistent with the findings of the ECB (2001), but the 
small sample size recommends interpreting these results with caution. 
Considering the new bad debt ratio, the evidence for large banks confirms that credit 
quality deteriorates during the recessionary phases of the business cycle; the long-run impact 
of GDP growth is very close to the figure obtained for the unbalanced panel. INTM is no 
longer significant, but the other proxy for risk-taking behaviour (EQCAPIT) turns out to be 
significant when lagged and shows a positive sign.  
6.2 Do macroeconomic shocks have asymmetric effects? 
In theory, the magnitude of the impact of GDP changes on banks’ riskiness might 
differ depending on whether the economic system is in recessionary or expansionary phases. 
If this is the case, it might be appropriate to analyze this asymmetry. 
To deal with this issue, I re-estimate the static specifications introducing two slope 
dummy variables that interact with GDP growth. The first dummy (DOWN) is equal to 1 
during downswings and 0 otherwise; the second (UP), conversely, is equal to 1 during 
upswings and 0 otherwise. If GDP changes had asymmetric effects during 
expansions/recessions, the coefficients of the interaction regressors should be significantly 
different.  
For dating the recessionary phases I rely on the studies by Altissimo et al. (2000) and 
Bruno and Otranto (2004), whose results are considered to provide a very consistent 
description of the evolution of the business cycle in Italy. During the period 1987-2002 they 
identify three main recessions: the first from March 1992 to July 1993, the second from 
November 1995 to November 1996, and the third at the end of 2001; I thus set DOWN equal 
to 1 for 1992-1993, 1996 and 2002.  
Table 13 shows the coefficients of the interaction terms; the effects of the other 
regressors remain roughly unchanged and are therefore omitted.    30 
For the LLP equation, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients on the interactive 
dummies are quite similar in the two sub-periods. Most importantly, the F-tests fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal during downswings and upswings; hence, 
data tend to exclude significant asymmetries in banks’ provisioning policies in different 
macroeconomic conditions. 
The results are less clear-cut for the RISKFL equation. Indeed, there is some evidence 
of asymmetries in the transmission of the macroeconomic shocks. Apart from the 2-year 
lagged GDPCC, the F-tests suggest that the coefficients on GDP growth are significantly 
different during the business cycle fluctuations. In particular, in recessionary phases 
creditworthiness seems to deteriorate more heavily than it improves in expansions. However, 
it is worth recalling that the reduced significance of some of the coefficients may influence 
the results of the F-tests. This issue may be examined in greater detail in future ad hoc work. 
7. Conclusions 
Empirical observation suggests that banks behave procyclically since bad debts, 
provisions and loan losses are generally very low during booms. They start to be recorded at 
the peak of the upturn and rise significantly during the subsequent recession. This is often 
coupled with a contraction of earnings. The consequence is that banks tighten credit supply 
during downturns, thus further deepening the negative impact of the business cycle. 
Several empirical works have investigated the issue of procyclicality in banking, 
generally concluding that banks’ policies tend to be cyclical.  
Following this stream of research, this paper analyzes the behaviour of more than 200 
Italian banks over almost two decades to understand whether the stylized facts are confirmed 
in the Italian case. With respect to previous studies, this paper attempts to provide a more 
comprehensive framework, analyzing the evolution of loan loss provisions and new bad 
debts over the business cycle. 
The econometric outcomes confirm that banks’ loan loss provisions and new bad debts 
are affected by the evolution of the business cycle. The impact of recessionary conditions is 
significant and long-lasting.    31 
Variation in the premise of the models leaves the sign and the significance of the 
macroeconomic variables basically unchanged, although the magnitude of the effects may 
vary. For instance, the overall long-run partial effect of a 1 per cent change of GDP on the 
ratio between loan loss provisions and total loans swings between 0.13 and 0.17, depending 
on the model; for the flow of new bad debts over performing loans, the long-run impact is in 
the range of 0.23-0.33. These findings are consistent with the evidence for other countries.  
Moreover, data provide some support for the idea that intermediaries exploit 
provisioning policies to stabilize their income over time; however, the evidence on the 
income-smoothing hypothesis remains somewhat mixed, since the positive relation between 
provisions and profits is not significant in all the specifications. 
Along with the macroeconomic variables, several bank-level indicators also play a role 
in explaining the changes in the evolution of riskiness. This corroborates the idea that the 
overall performance of the intermediaries is the result of the interaction between the general 












Unbalanced 1985-2002 3207 207 5 18 15.5
Balanced 1985-2002 198 11 18 18 18





CIRATIO Cost-to-income ratio % Sup.statistics
FSERVIN Financial services revenue / gross income % Sup.statistics
EQCAPIT Equity capital / total assets % Sup.statistics
SIZE Log total assets % Sup.statistics
ROA ROA (operating profit / total assets) % Sup.statistics
LLP Loan loss provisions (flow) / total loans % Sup.statistics
RISKST Bad debts (gross of provisions) / total loans % Sup.statistics
RISKFL Flow of new bad debts (t) / performing loans (t-1) % Credit Register
CREDGR Credit growth % Sup.statistics
INTM Interest margin / total assets % Sup.statistics
LLPODD Ln (LLP / (100-LLP ))
RSKFLODD Ln (RISKFL / (100-RISKFL))
Macroeconomic
MIBC Milan Stock Exchange index - percentage change % Datastream
BTPR 10-year Italian T-bond rate - level % Bank of Italy
SPREAD Spread between loan and deposit rate - level % Bank of Italy
GDPCC GDP - percentage change % ISTAT
SELECTED VARIABLES 
Table 3  
 
 
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max Median
MIBC 20 14.3 33.2 -27.7 104.1 14.6
BTPR 20 9.9 4.3 3.7 17.7 10.8
SPREAD 20 5.5 1.1 3.6 8.5 5.5
GDPCC 20 2.0 1.1 -0.9 3.9 2.0
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICSTable 4  
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max Median
   CIRATIO 3207 63,2 14,8 9,1 291,3 63,4
   FSERVIN 3207 22,9 12,1 -53,4 87,6 22,6
   EQCAPIT 3207 8,3 4,2 0,9 63,7 7,7
   SIZE 3207 14,0 1,6 9,6 19,2 13,9
   ROA 3207 1,8 0,8 -4,5 6,0 1,8
   LLP 3207 1,1 1,0 0,0 7,7 0,8
   RISKST 3207 6,7 5,1 0,0 37,7 5,5
   RISKFL 3207 2,1 1,7 0,0 13,5 1,6
   CREDGR 3207 13,3 21,1 -94,0 533,0 11,8
   INTM 3207 3,7 1,2 0,0 7,1 3,7
   LLPODD 3207 -4,9 1,0 -10,2 -2,5 -4,8
RSKFLODD 3207 -4,2 0,9 -8,6 -1,9 -4,1






Raw data -3.062 *** -3.154 ***
Demeaned -3.276 *** -3.417 ***
Raw data -2.592 *** -3.146 ***
Demeaned -3.039 *** -3.422 ***
t-bar statistics - 2 lags
IPS TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS (1)
LLP
RISKFL
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test for unit roots in panel data based
on the mean of the individual Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics of each
unit in the panel (Ho: presence of a unit root). Tests are carried out on a
balanced panel of 1802 obs. (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum and F.
Bornhorst).
 
Table 5  
Table 6  
 
 
LLP CREDGR CIRATIO ROA RISKST RISKFL GDPCC L1GDPCC L2GDPCC BTPR MIBC SPREAD
LLP 1,000
CREDGR -0,148 1,000
CIRATIO 0,128 0,029 1,000
ROA -0,028 0,012 -0,656 1,000
RISKST 0,444 -0,211 0,169 -0,168 1,000
RISKFL 0,419 -0,046 0,064 0,018 0,505 1,000
GDPCC -0,124 0,108 -0,025 0,058 0,062 -0,086 1,000
L1GDPCC -0,178 0,099 -0,083 0,104 -0,048 -0,119 0,364 1,000
L2GDPCC -0,206 0,060 -0,049 0,042 -0,110 -0,107 -0,066 0,341 1,000
BTPR -0,062 0,059 -0,063 0,219 -0,043 0,228 0,220 0,106 0,080 1,000
MIBC 0,016 -0,018 -0,022 0,065 0,084 0,117 0,130 -0,018 -0,151 -0,016 1,000
SPREAD -0,034 0,009 -0,034 0,183 -0,042 0,192 0,011 0,089 0,069 0,826 -0,157 1,000
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 per cent level.




















Intercept 0,9780 0,1911 *** 1,1825 0,1181 *** 1,1864 0,1112 ***
BANK 
SPECIFIC
CREDGR +/- -0,0109 0,0015 *** -0,0064 0,0020 *** -0,0074 0,0010 ***
Lag1CREDGR +/- -0,0054 0,0016 *** -0,0017 0,0012 -0,0023 0,0009 ***
CIRATIO +
Lag1CIRATIO +
ROA + 0,1487 0,0411 *** 0,0846 0,3011 *** 0,9633 0,0237 ***
RISKST +
Lag1RISKST + 0,5541 0,0073 *** 0,0443 0,0061 *** 0,0479 0,0044 ***
RISKFL + 0,1907 0,0212 *** 0,1797 0,0206 *** 0,1842 0,0118 ***
Lag1RISKFL + 0,0600 0,0187 *** 0,0701 0,0178 ***
MACRO
BTPR +/- 0,0204 0,0081 ** 0,0207 0,0087 ** 0,1945 0,0078 **
Lag1BTPR +/-
MIBC + 0,0048 0,0006 *** 0,0049 0,0007 *** 0,0048 0,0006 ***
Lag1MIBC - -0,0045 0,0006 *** -0,0042 0,0006 *** -0,0043 0,0006 ***
SPREAD + -0,1373 0,0246 *** -0,1315 0,2479 *** -0,1332 0,0245 ***
Lag1SPREAD +
GDPCC - -0,0427 0,0178 ** -0,0389 0,1922 ** -0,0421 0,0149 ***
Lag1GDPCC -
Lag2GDPCC - -0,1260 0,0152 *** -0,1307 0,0174 *** -0,1335 0,0138 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0 ***
B-P LM (4) ***
Hausman (5) ***
Panel-hetero (6) ***
Panel-AR (1) (7) **
2642 2642
0,37
Chi2 (1) = 188.29
F (12, 2424) =55.31
F (205, 2424) =3.26
Chi2 (12) = 141.96
Chi2 (12) = 1357.49
Chi2 (206) = 2.2e+31
F (1, 200) = 4.682
Random effects
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS - STATIC SPECIFICATION (1)
Fixed effects (LSDV) Pooled regression
2642
0,51
F (12, 2629) = 59.22
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Static model in which the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is the dependent variable. The most
parsimonious specification of the LSDV model has been selected by a general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the
individual effects are not reported. (2) Newey-West robust standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and
autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D. Roodman). (3) Wald test that all the coefficients (except intercept and
FE) are jointly not significant. (4) Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for the pooled regression (Ho: pooled regression
against Ha: RE). (5) Hausman test for random effects (Ho: RE against Ha: FE). (6) Modified Wald statistic for groupwise
heteroskedasticity in fixed effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (7) Wooldridge-test for first order serial
correlation (Stata routine provided by D. M. Drukker).Explanatory variable Exp. sign Coeffic. Robust SE (2) Sign. lev.
BANK SPECIFIC
Lag1LLP + 0,1715 0,0390 ***
Lag2LLP + 0,0506 0,0239 **






Lag1RISKST + 0,0499 0,0136 ***




Lag1BTPR +/- -0,2401 0,1199 **
MIBC + 0,0026 0,0008 ***
Lag1MIBC - -0,0044 0,0006 ***
SPREAD + -0,0785 0,0237 ***
Lag1SPREAD + 0,1117 0,0384 ***
GDPCC -
Lag1GDPCC -




Arellano-Bond AR (1) (5) ***
Arellano-Bond AR (2) (5) z =  1.09
First-differenced equation
2400
Chi2(8)  = 189.32
Chi2(270)  = 195.36
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS - DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION (1)
z = -8.23
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Dynamic (first differenced) model in which the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is the
dependent variable. The results are from the one-step GMM estimator. All the regressors are treated as
exogenous, except the contemporaneous bank-specific variables that are considered endogenous. The most
parsimonious specification has been selected by a general-to-simple approach. (2) Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors. (3) Wald test that all the coefficients are jointly not significant. (4) Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions from the two-step estimator. (5) Arellano-Bond test for first and second-order
autocorrelation in the residuals.
 
Table 8 
 Table 9 
 
 
RISKFL CREDGR CIRATIO INTM EQCAPIT GDPCC L1GDPCC L2GDPCC BTPR MIBC SPREAD
RISKFL 1,000
CREDGR -0,046 1,000
CIRATIO 0,064 0,029 1,000
INTM 0,193 -0,010 -0,127 1,000
EQCAPIT 0,038 -0,035 -0,081 0,170 1,000
GDPCC -0,086 0,108 -0,025 0,063 -0,191 1,000
L1GDPCC -0,119 0,099 -0,083 0,072 -0,206 0,364 1,000
L2GDPCC -0,107 0,060 -0,049 0,038 -0,147 -0,066 0,341 1,000
BTPR 0,228 0,059 -0,063 0,420 -0,171 0,220 0,106 0,080 1,000
MIBC 0,117 -0,018 -0,022 0,053 -0,112 0,130 -0,018 -0,151 -0,016 1,000
SPREAD 0,192 0,009 -0,034 0,391 -0,093 0,011 0,089 0,069 0,826 -0,157 1,000
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 per cent level.























Lag1CREDGR +/- -0,0065 0,0024 *** -0,0069 0,0023 *** -0,0061 0,0015 ***
CIRATIO + 0,0102 0,0027 *** 0,0160 0,0033 *** 0,0122 0,0027 ***
Lag1CIRATIO + -0,0153 0,0042 *** -0,0144 0,0037 *** -0,0138 0,0031 ***
INTM +





Lag1BTPR +/- 0,1249 0,0117 *** 0,1256 0,0117 *** 0,1245 0,0095 ***
MIBC + 0,0039 0,0011 *** 0,0035 0,0012 *** 0,0038 0,0010 ***
Lag1MIBC - 0,0034 0,0010 *** 0,0032 0,0010 *** 0,0034 0,0010 ***
SPREAD +
Lag1SPREAD +
GDPCC - -0,1044 0,0242 *** -0,1078 0,0284 *** -0,1037 0,0241 ***
Lag1GDPCC - -0,1274 0,0251 *** -0,1312 0,0311 *** -0,1277 0,0264 ***
Lag2GDPCC - -0,1141 0,0254 *** -0,1106 0,0325 *** -0,1120 0,0234 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0 ***
B-P LM (4) ***
Hausman (5)
Panel-hetero (6) ***
Panel-AR (1) (7) ***
Random effects
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
FLOW OF NEW BAD DEBTS - STATIC SPECIFICATION
Fixed effects (LSDV) Pooled regression
2642 2642 2642
0,49 0,16
Chi2 (10) = 11.40
Chi2 (206) = 1.3e+32
F(1, 200) = 24.175
Chi2 (10) = 662.87 F(10, 2426) = 60.01 F(10, 2631)  = 46.00
 F (205, 2426) = 7.99
Chi2 (1) = 1859.08
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Static model in which the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to total loans is the dependent variable. The most
parsimonious specification of the LSDV model has been selected by a general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the
individual effects are not reported. (2) Newey-West robust standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and
autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D. Roodman). (3) Wald test that all the coefficients (except intercept and
FE) are jointly not significant. (4) Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for the pooled regression (Ho: pooled regression
against Ha: RE). (5) Hausman test for random effects (Ho: RE against Ha: FE). (6) Modified Wald statistic for groupwise
heteroskedasticity in fixed effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (7) Wooldridge test for first-order serial
correlation (Stata routine provided by D. M. Drukker). 
Table 11
Explanatory variable Exp. sign Coeffic. Robust SE (2) Sign. lev.
BANK SPECIFIC
Lag1RISKFL + 0,1538 0,0320 ***
Lag2RISKFL +
CREDGR +/-
Lag1CREDGR +/- -0,0079 0,0029 ***
CIRATIO +
Lag1CIRATIO + -0,0138 0,0053 ***






Lag1BTPR +/- 0,1418 0,0301 ***
MIBC +
Lag1MIBC - 0,0031 0,0009 ***
SPREAD +
Lag1SPREAD + 0,2688 0,0494 ***
GDPCC -
Lag1GDPCC - -0,1536 0,0260 ***




Arellano-Bond AR (1) (5) ***
Arellano-Bond AR (2) (5)
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
FLOW OF NEW BAD DEBTS - DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION (1)
z =  -7.29
z =   0.74
First-differenced equation
2400
Chi2(202)      =    198.05
Chi2(8)      =    203.07
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Dynamic (first differenced) model in which the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to total loans
is the dependent variable. The results are from the one-step GMM estimator. All the regressors are treated
as exogenous, except the contemporaneous bank-specific variables that are considered endogenous. The
most parsimonious specification has been selected by a general-to-simple approach. (2) Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors. (3) Wald test that all the coefficients are jointly not significant. (4) Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions from the two-step estimator. (5) Arellano-Bond test for first and second-order




Coeffic. N-W SE 




CREDGR -0,0160 0,0066 **
Lag1CREDGR -0,0173 0,0073 **
CIRATIO 0,0275 0,0107 **
Lag1CIRATIO -0,0286 0,0129 **
ROA
RISKST 0,0501 0,0180 ***
Lag1RISKST





Lag1EQCAPIT 0,1396 0,0746 **
FSERVIN
MACRO
BTPR 0,0913 0,0333 ***
Lag1BTPR -0,0704 0,0252 *** 0,1711 0,0238 ***
MIBC 0,0051 0,0016 *** 0,0098 0,0030 ***
Lag1MIBC -0,0042 0,0018 ** 0,0066 0,0025 ***
SPREAD -0,1451 0,0555 ***
Lag1SPREAD
GDPCC -0,2231 0,0550 ***
Lag1GDPCC
Lag2GDPCC -0,0734 0,0406 * -0,1665 0,0464 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** ***
F-test all FE=0 *** ***
Panel-hetero (4) *** ***
Panel-AR (1) (5)
F(18, 147) = 4.29
F(10, 156) = 3.78
176
0,77
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - BALANCED PANEL
FIXED EFFECTS (LSDV) (1)
Chi2 (11)= 279.54
F(1, 10) = 1.576
Loan loss provisions New bad debts
176
0,57
F(9, 156) = 17.01
F(1, 10) = 0.555
F(10, 156) = 19.17  
Chi2 (11) = 562.77
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Grey areas denote the variables included in the most general specification for each equation; the most
parsimonious specification has been selected by a general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the individual
effects are not reported. (2) Newey-West standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and
autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D. Roodman). (3) Wald test that all the coefficients (except
intercept and FE) are jointly not significant. (4) Modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed
effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (5) Wooldridge test for first-order serial correlation (Stata
routine provided by D. M. Drukker). 
Table 13 
 
DOWN UP DOWN UP DOWN UP
-0,029 -0.046 (**) -0.131 (***) -0.127 (***)
-0.491 (***) -0.052  0,149 -0.146 (***) -0.222 (***) -0.096 (***)
IMPACT OF GDP GROWTH  DURING DOWNTURNS/UPTURNS (1)
L1GDPCC* L2GDPCC* GDPCC*
 F(1, 2422) = 0.03
F(1, 2423) = 6.47 (**) F(1, 2423) = 2.07
F(1, 2422) = 0.09 





*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) The table reports the coefficients of GDP growth for the static models in different phases of the business cycle. Two
intercept dummies interact with GDPCC, L1GDPCC and L2GDPCC: DOWN equal to 1 during recessions (1992, 1993, 1996 and
2002) and 0 otherwise; UP equal to 1 during expansions and 0 otherwise. (2) F-test that the coefficients of DOWN*GDPCC and
UP*GDPCC (DOWN*L1GDPCC and UP*L1GDPCC; DOWN*L2GDPCC and UP*L2GDPCC) are equal each other. 
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FIGURE 2 - LLP - STATIC MODEL












1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Fitted Actual 95 per cent CI    
 
FIGURE 4 - NEW BAD DEBTS - STATIC MODEL
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